

# Gender Gaps in Policy Making: Evidence from Direct Democracy in Switzerland

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## 1. Introduction

An old claim states that if women ruled the world, it would be a better place. Apart from rare evidence from certain matrilineal and patriarchal societies (Andersen et al., 2008; Gneezy, Leonard and List, 2009), the substance of this claim is difficult to assess.

One reason is that women are under-represented in most legislatures around the world (see e.g. Norris and Krook, 2011 for evidence). On average, only one in five members of national parliaments is a woman. The situation is even more dismal at the top of national governments: only 20 out of 180 of the world's 180 heads of state are women (The Economist, 2012). As a result, women's voices are more likely to go unheard than those of men.

In response, gender quotas have been increasingly debated in the public and among politicians as a means to raise the share of women among policy-makers (for example, Norris and Krook, 2011). A few countries in Europe have indeed implemented gender quotas for candidates in parliamentary elections: Belgium, Ireland, Poland, Slovakia, Greece and France, for examples (see the Global Database of Quotas for Women at <http://www.quotaproject.org>). And a number of European countries have adopted voluntary quotas for women in selected political parties (for example, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Italy, Germany, Hungary or the Czech Republic). While quotas have improved female representation (see De Paola, Scoppa and Lombardo, 2010, for Italy; Bagues and Esteve-Volart, 2012, for Spain), little is known today whether quotas have any effects on policy-making (one exception being Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004).

Taking a step back from the debate about gender quotas and why women are still under-represented in politics, the broader question arises whether and where women and men prefer different policies. The more aligned women and men's preferences in a specific area, the smaller the expected effect from legal intervention. While preferences expressed in surveys such as the Eurobarometer or the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) are informative to a certain degree, the major drawback is that survey respondents have little incentive to think hard about the questions at hand, as there are no real consequences involved (e.g. Brunner, Ross and Washington, 2011).

This article analyzes gender gaps for policies in a setting where every citizen is a potential policy maker. The context is Switzerland, one of the oldest democracies in the world. Swiss citizens make political decisions at the

ballot on a broad range of policy issues. Citizens decide on a number of ballots up to four times each year, which makes Switzerland the world leader in the use of direct democracy. Over the last fifty years, more than 300 ballots votes have been held at the federal level alone.

In our setting, citizens vote on specific projects with real political and financial consequences. Citizens have long experience in voting on ballot proposals as there is a long tradition of direct democratic participation at the state and local level as well. Furthermore, each citizen receives detailed information about each ballot (including the implied fiscal consequences if a ballot is approved) by mail before the vote.

Incentives for strategic behavior are basically absent as a ballot requires a simple 'yes' or 'no' vote. We can therefore identify gender differences in policy preferences as revealed at the ballot box. Our preference measures have two main advantages over survey questions on desired policies (as asked in the Eurobarometer, for example). First, citizens make a policy-relevant choice, and therefore are more likely to acquire information on the topic. Second, ballot votes (if approved) involve taxpayers' money, and the documents distributed prior to the vote clearly indicate the implied fiscal consequences. Therefore, our data allow us to study whether gender gaps persist even if that involves an increase in federal expenditures.

Many of the ballot proposals we study, like social policies or environmental protection, are currently hotly debated in advanced democracies. Governments in many countries with aging populations, for example, consider an increase in the retirement age. We find that women are much less sympathetic towards such policies.

Further, women show consistently higher approval rates for allocating funds to environmental protection than men. At the same time, women are less supportive of nuclear energy. We also find that women are more in favour of a healthy life style, for equal rights for men and women, for support of the disabled but against the military. In sum, we find that women clearly prefer different policies than men. Since we control for the most important socio-demographics (such as age, education or income), gender differences in these variables are not driving our results.<sup>1</sup>

The data for our analysis come from surveys which are held shortly after the federal ballots. Starting in 1981, representative samples of roughly 1,000 eligible voters are asked whether, and if so, how they voted. Unlike other surveys, survey accuracy is perfectly measurable in our case, as we observe stated approval in the surveys and actual approval from official ballot statistics. We show that biases in our surveys are unlikely to cause the gender gaps we find. In addition, the survey also collects a broad range of socio-economic characteristics, which allows us to compare women and men with a similar socio-demographic background.

The data also allow us to investigate the financial consequences of women's political choices. To do so, we restrict the analysis to the sample of federal votes that would have raised government spending, taxes or debt – if approved. Overall, we find that women are only modestly more inclined to approve projects that increase the size of government. Compared to men, they were 2.5 percentage points more likely to approve costly policy proposals. More importantly, women prefer a very different composition of government expenditures than men. Women were 10 percentage points more likely to support spending for protection of the environment and 6 percentage points less likely to support spending on military.

The most immediate lesson that we can learn from our analysis is that women as policy makers, deciding on actual policy proposals with financial consequences, choose different policies than men. This suggests that gender quotas - by lifting the share of women in politics - would lead to better representation of female preferences in certain policy areas like the environment or military spending.

The rest of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 relates our article to the previous literature in economics and political science. Section 3 introduces the Swiss political context and describes our data. Section 4

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<sup>1</sup> If gender gaps were determined by income differences alone, women and men should vote similarly conditional on financial well-being. If non-economic factors such as values, attitudes and beliefs, matter and differ between men and women, gender gaps persist even when socio-economic characteristics are kept constant (see e.g. Fong, 2001; Alesina and Ferrara, 2005; Luttmer and Singhal, 2011; and Alesina and Giuliano, 2011).

analyses the gender gaps in voting and section 5 sheds light on the fiscal consequences of female policy makers. Conclusions are presented in section 6.

## 2. Relation to Literature on Women in Policy-Making

Our article is related to several literatures in economics and political science. First, our study enhances our understanding of gender gaps in preferences. By studying individual voting decisions on all relevant policy areas of an advanced democracy, our study is complementary to experimental evidence (see the survey by Croson and Gneezy, 2008) or studies based on hypothetical questions in surveys (e.g. Bertrand, 2010 for a comprehensive survey of the literature). One advantage of our direct democratic setting is that we can elicit gender gaps as revealed at the ballot box. Some of our evidence is also in line with earlier studies, for example, that women are more supportive of redistributive policies (e.g. for the disabled) than men (e.g. Luttmer and Singhal, 2011; Alesina and Giuliano, 2011).

Second, our article relates to research in political science on the electoral gender gap (see e.g. Inglehart and Norris, 2003; Inglehart and Norris, 2005; Edlund and Pande, 2002). Here, the focus is on party votes and the characterization of gender gaps along a single, right-left dimension. We add to this literature by analysing gender gaps on a variety of issues. Other studies have tried to elicit gender gaps in policy preferences from opinion polls like the General Social Survey, the Gallup or National Election Surveys (see e.g. Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986; Mueller 1988).<sup>2</sup> While these studies are suggestive, the questions asked are often fairly general and typically do not involve decisions about concrete projects and how they would be financed.

We compare the gender gaps in our ballot propositions to gender gaps in survey questions on public spending in the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), whose questions are the most comparable to our ballots. There respondents were asked whether they would like to spend much more, more, not more nor less, less or much less on several policy areas (the environment, military, health etc.). We find few and statistically weak gender gaps in the ISSP data. We conclude from this comparison that it is difficult to elicit actual policy preferences from stated attitudes to very general questions which likely introduce substantial measurement error into the analysis. In addition, survey questions do not specify the specific fiscal costs of a different policy. In our direct democratic setting in Switzerland, however, citizens face very concrete proposals with real consequences, and consider the direct implications for the tax bill as well.

Third, our paper is relevant for the literature on female policy makers. So far, most causal evidence on the impact of female policy makers is available for India, where women are found to affect policies according to their preferences (Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Clots-Figueras, 2011; 2012). Based on imposed mandates for female village leaders in India, Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004), for example, show that women allocate resources to projects supporting women's needs, for example, public investments in fresh drinking water.

For the developed world, Rehavi (2007) finds that increasing representation of women in the United States led to a modest increase in health and correction institution spending. In contrast, Gagliarducci and Paserman (2012) and Ferreira and Gyourko (2011) find no consistent effects of female mayors on local spending in Italy and the United States, respectively.

These mixed results on the role of female policy makers in mature democracies beg for an explanation. One reason could be that politicians are bound by party discipline, or that post-electoral bargaining makes gender gaps disappear.<sup>3</sup> A second explanation could be that policy preferences between men and women do not differ even in

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<sup>2</sup> A comparable data source for Europe is the Eurobarometer, a public opinion survey in the EU member states. There are however few surveys that directly ask for allocation of governmental resources. Only in the survey of March/April 1984, seventeen questions were asked whether government spending is too little/about right/ too much in a certain policy area. However, the questions do not discuss how the money would be actually spent or how the additional spending would be financed.

<sup>3</sup> In theory, electoral competition may also diminish gender differences if politicians simply represent the preferences of the median voter. Recent empirical evidence, however, casts doubt on the Downsian view of the political process (e.g. Lee, Moretti, and Butler, 2004; Levitt, 1996; Washington, 2008; Svaleryd,

the voting population as a whole. This paper casts doubts on the second explanation, as we find sizeable gender differences in preferences for a variety of policy areas. Therefore, the lack of impact of female policy makers in certain settings is unlikely to be caused by similar preferences in the voting population at large. Rather, it may be related to the competitive selection process of policy makers, and/or the limited power after election, e.g. due to party pressure.

Finally, we shed light on the debate whether political involvement of women increases the size of government. While for the United States, women's suffrage might have increased state level spending (Lott and Kenny, 1999; Miller, 2008, reports an insignificant estimate), results for Europe are mixed (Aidt, Duta and Loukoianova, 2006; Aidt and Dallal, 2008; Bertocchi, 2011). In contrast to these aggregate studies, we rely on individual data on actual policy choices. Our results support the view that inclusion of female preferences in the political decision making process has small effects on total spending.

### 3. Data on Voting Behaviour in Federal Propositions

To analyse differences in policy choices between men and women, we make use of the fact that Switzerland has wide-ranging possibilities for direct democratic participation. We focus in this study on the political decisions of citizens at the federal level. National-level policies span a broad range of political decisions including important decisions on the military and foreign policy which can typically not be studied using state-level data.

In Switzerland, citizens can propose an initiative for a partial or total revision of the federal constitution. If 50,000 signatures are collected, citizens can also request a referendum about each law proposed by the federal government. Furthermore, a referendum is mandatory for any changes to the constitution and all international treaties Switzerland wants to ratify. As a consequence, citizens vote on federal ballots several times each year.

In Switzerland, every person older than 18 is allowed to vote (before March 1991, the minimum age was 20). No registration is necessary, and every eligible person automatically receives the official documents to vote which includes detailed information on the ballot to be decided. Specifically, the information package of the federal government contains the arguments for and against the proposition, a printed version of the parliamentary debate (if any) and often outside opinions by interest groups. Most importantly, the distributed documents contain the estimated financial consequences, i.e. whether and by how much expenditures or taxes would increase if the proposition was approved.

Hence, Swiss citizens have easy access to information about the ballots both through the distributed documents and discussions in the media. In our data, 78 percent of voters report that they were well informed about the ballot prior to the vote. Furthermore, they have practiced their direct democratic participation rights for more than a century at the federal level and even longer in many states ('cantons'). We therefore believe that the electorate is able to make informed choices about the proposed ballots.

The data we use for our analysis of federal ballots are taken from the VOX surveys, which are conducted by telephone shortly after each vote (for more information on the data source, see <http://www.gfsbern.ch>). Overall, we have data for 185 of the 202 federal propositions held between 1981 and 2003.

The survey collects data on voting behavior for a representative sample of 1,000 (before 1987, 700) Swiss citizens. The survey asks about the voting decision in the last federal ballot and whether the respondent was informed about the propositions. It also collects information on general political attitudes and party preferences as well as the respondent's demographic and economic situation.

Since we are interested in comparing choices of female and male voters, we dropped all respondents under the age of twenty, who were not eligible to vote until March of 1991, and under eighteen thereafter. Even though earlier surveys also ask non-voters about their preferred voting outcome, we focus in the main analysis on actual

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2009). The evidence seems to be more consistent with a framework where candidates cannot fully commit to an electoral platform (Alesina, 1988, Osborne and Slivinski, 1996; Besley and Coate, 1997).

voters. Arguably, the politically active population is the most relevant for understanding the consequences if more women enter politics, especially in countries other than Switzerland. In the appendix, we show that gender gaps are similar for the broader sample of Swiss citizens.

Our data have a number of advantages over previously employed surveys: first, we use information on voting behavior with *real* political and financial consequences. Since every eligible voter receives detailed information about these consequences before each vote, we consider the voting decisions as a more reliable indicator of policy preferences than hypothetical questions from opinion polls. In addition, the policy choices are representative for the electorate as a whole since individuals in all cantons vote on the same proposition. Second, the votes cover a wide range of political issues, such as health policy, changes in unemployment insurance, new environmental policies, subsidies for agriculture or membership in international organizations. While the set of issues decided at the ballot box does not coincide with the set of decisions taken by members of parliament, the political choices are very similar.

Table 1 reports summary statistics of the survey data separately for men and women over the period from 1981 to 2003. With the exception of household income and number of children, all variables are available for the 185 votes.

--- insert Table 1 about here ---

Table 1 reflects the more traditional position of women in Swiss society: women are on average less educated than men and have lower income available to them. The female labour force participation rate is low compared to the United States as is the fraction of divorced people. Women in the sample are also more likely to live in urban areas and in the French- and Italian-speaking cantons of Switzerland. Finally, female turnout at the ballot box is also slightly lower than for men. Over the whole sample, male turnout is 62 percent, and female turnout is 54 percent. The gender gap in turnout seems to be slightly decreasing over time.

#### 4. Gender Gaps at the Ballot Box

We first show the votes with the *largest* gender differences in approval in the 185 votes held between 1981 and 2003 in Table 2. The Appendix briefly describes the main goals and fiscal implications of the ten votes.

Women were 18 percentage points more likely to support an initiative for a reduction in tobacco consumption. More generally, women are much more supportive of votes to promote a healthy. Not surprisingly, women were also more likely to support votes for the equal representation of women in the federal government and a reform of marital law that stresses equal rights and responsibilities of husband and wife. In addition, women were more supportive of anti-discrimination policies, the protection of the environment and government subsidies for the disabled. On the other hand, they oppose the use of nuclear energy.

On specific policies then, women voted quite differently than men. Is this result real or just the consequence of non-response or reporting bias in the VOX surveys? If untruthful reporting or selective response (on the part of men, women, or both) was a problem, one should see a discrepancy between survey and real approval rates.<sup>4</sup> In contrast to other surveys, we can directly measure non-response or reporting bias by comparing the average approval of voters in the survey with the official result of the ballot.

For seven votes shown in Table 2, the difference between stated approval in the survey and the official result is only 1.7 percentage points on average and statistically insignificant. Three votes have a statistically different approval in the survey compared to the ballot box. Citizen support in the survey is significantly higher compared

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<sup>4</sup> Funk (2012) analyses in detail the survey bias of the VOX data. As it turns out, the VOX surveys are representative of the eligible voting population along various dimensions (gender, age, language). A gap between stated and real approval is therefore most likely to be caused by unobservable differences (e.g. policy preferences) or deliberate falsification. However, consistent survey biases are concentrated in a few policy areas (immigration, international integration, rights for homosexual couples).

to approval rates at the ballot box in the two policy areas environmental protection and gender equality (the difference is 7 percentage points for the vote “Protection of Rivers and Lakes”, 10 percentage point for the vote “For a car free Sunday” and 12 percentage point for the vote “Change in marital law”). However, the gender gaps in preferences are much larger than the survey bias, which strongly suggests that women indeed prefer different policies than men.

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Table 2 is restricted to voters who have made actual choices at the ballot and are therefore well informed about the subject at hand. Yet, we find very similar gender gaps if we add non-voters to our sample (the VOX analysis asks non-voters how they would have voted in the ballot). There are two exceptions: for the votes directly related to gender (change in marital law; equal rights of men and women), the gender gaps among the voters are larger than for the average population (17 % vs. 7 % and 14.5 % vs. 7 %). The reason is a combination of unusually high turnout of women and a higher representation of more extreme preferences among voters.

While suggestive, our summary statistics also show that women in the sample differ along other observable dimensions from men, for example, they are more likely to live in urban areas and have less income. To control for such possible confounding factors, we now turn to a more systematic analysis of political gender gaps.

In what follows, we focus on eleven main policy areas: two areas are state affairs (international relations and legal provisions on direct democracy and gender), four areas cover public goods (environment, transportation, defense and culture), two cover the public provision of a private good (education, health), and three areas are about transfers and redistribution (agricultural subsidies, social security provisions and subsidies for housing). To classify the federal ballot propositions into the eleven policy areas, we used the title and description of the vote. We focused on policy areas that seemed interesting beyond the Swiss setting and classified 87 (out of 185) votes. To make this selection as transparent as possible, Appendix Table 1 lists all the 185 votes (title, gender gap and year of the vote), together with information on whether the vote was falling into one of the eleven policy areas or not. If classified, the table also shows the policy area it belongs to. As can be seen from this Appendix table, there are nine votes on environmental protection ranging from the introduction of car-free Sundays to subsidizing solar energy with governmental funds.

A vote of yes might not reflect support for a certain policy. Therefore, we code votes within each policy area such that ‘yes’ always implies a preference for more (or less) of a policy. For example, all votes on agricultural policy are coded such that a vote of ‘yes’ implies supporting a reduction in agricultural subsidies.

Our statistical analysis then relates the support for more (or less) of a policy in a ballot to the respondent’s gender, controlling for age, education, marital status, house ownership, employment, religion and residential type (urban versus non-urban). Furthermore, we control for the region of residence (by including canton fixed effects) and to adjust for the fact that some ballots receive more overall support than others (by including ballot-fixed effects).

Table 3 reports the effects of gender on the voting decision in each policy area. As can be seen from Table 3 first page, women are more immigration friendly than men, are more likely to support projects protecting the environment, but are against nuclear energy or the military. Women also have a 22 percentage point higher probability than men to approve measures towards gender equality. From Table 3 second page we can see that there are gender differences in supporting a healthy life style (women are 16.3 percentage points more likely to approve measures targeting at reducing tobacco and alcohol consumption) and the use of gen-technology and animal testing. In the area of social security, women support a decrease in the retirement age more than men. Last, women are relatively more supportive of the disabled and in favour of a longer maternity leave. After listing the policies where women and men’s preferences differ, we also would like to mention some policy areas (e.g. transport, direct democracy, education, the regulation of leisure) with no gender differences.

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To what extent could these gender differences be driven by reporting bias? As shown in Funk (2012), surveys are inaccurate especially in policy areas with a predominant politically correct view (race and gender). For the votes on gender equality, it could therefore be that reporting and non-response bias potentially differ between women and men and partly account for the observed gender differences in the survey. However, as can be seen from Appendix Table 2, gender differences persist when restricting the sample to the votes with no survey bias.<sup>5</sup> Therefore, the gender gaps discovered in the areas of environment, the military, healthy life-style or regarding the age of retirement seem to be genuine preference differences between women and men. For the policies in the area of immigration and support for the disabled, such a statement is more difficult as there are no votes without survey bias. Nevertheless, there is no strong a priori reason as for why biases in the area of immigration should differ across gender. Concerning the disabled, it may be that women feel more pressured to appear caring due to underlying social norms, and this may partly explain the gender gap in this vote.

So far, we have used house ownership as a proxy for income (as income is only available in the later votes). However, since women have lower income on average, this may affect their preferences for redistribution (Meltzer and Richard, 1981; Lott and Kenny, 1999), or potentially also their demand for environmental protection. Table 4 re-investigates the estimated gender gaps, while controlling more rigorously for potential income differences between women and men.

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Table 4 first row re-estimates previous baseline regressions (underlying Table 3) for the sample of votes where household income had been asked for in the surveys. The second row adds dummies for each educational category (instead of only a dummy university education) and the third row adds household income. Interestingly, for the policy areas immigration and environment, the gender gaps get even larger. Otherwise, it is notable that whenever gender gaps are statistically significant in the baseline (at the 5 percent level), they remain so when controlling for income. As such, income differences are certainly not the cause behind the observed gender gaps. As a last check, we analyze gender gaps for a subgroup of the population, where income is comparable for women and men: the married respondents. Again, the largest gender gaps discovered earlier prevail.

While we focus on the voters in the main analysis, it would be interesting to know whether the gender gaps are also present for the non-voters. Unfortunately, non-voters were asked how they would have voted only in the earlier votes (before 2000). Comparing women's and men's approval for these early votes - separately for voters and non-voters - it can be seen that gender gaps in the policy areas environment, nuclear energy, healthy life-style, gen-technology and the military are present for both subgroups (see Appendix Table 3). One important difference between voters and non-voters concerns the policy area "equal rights for women and men": there, large gender differences are found in the voting population, but not in the non-voting population. Plausibly, citizens with extreme preferences made their way to the polls.

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<sup>5</sup> A vote is not subject to survey bias if the null hypothesis "share yes" among self-declared voters in the survey equal to official "share yes" in the respective ballot cannot be rejected at the 5% level.

## 5. The Fiscal Consequences of Women as Policy Makers

So far, we analysed gender gaps in approval rates for proposed policies independently of their fiscal consequences. Suppose however, that women are fiscally more conservative than men. Then, they may not favour costly projects for environmental protection even though they may care more about it than men.

We next analyse whether women and men differ in how they like to allocate government resources. To analyse the fiscal preferences of men and women, we selected a subset of ballots that would have unambiguously increased or decreased government spending.

In order to assess the fiscal impact of each proposition, we used the official documents prepared by the government, which outline the estimated financial consequences, i.e. whether and by how much spending would increase if the proposition was approved by the electorate. After careful study, we identified 71 (of the 202) propositions between 1981 and 2003 where the documents showed unambiguous financial consequences.

Appendix Table 4 contains a detailed list of these votes. Note that the set of propositions we analyse contains both ballots that were approved and therefore affected actual government spending as well as ballots that were not approved. As a consequence, we have a representative set of actual political decisions and their financial consequences, which is not affected by the ballot's actual success.

The model we estimate is the same as in the last section except that we now use only the subset of votes with predictable financial consequences. Our dependent variable is whether a voter supports a ballot that would increase government spending if approved. If the ballot proposed a reduction of spending, taxes, subsidies or debt, we rescaled the voting choice as one if the respondent voted against the ballot and zero if the voter approved a reduction in government spending in that area.

Table 5 displays the results for overall government spending as well as spending in seven different policy areas (education, health, welfare, environment and nuclear policy, defense spending, transportation and agricultural policy).<sup>6</sup> The first column shows that women are 2.5 percentage points more likely to support projects that would increase overall government spending. They are also 3.1 percentage points less likely to support a reduction of government debt though the coefficient is not significantly different from zero. Therefore, men and women do not differ much overall in their support for costly projects.

However, the picture is different if we look at individual policy areas. Here, we find that women are 10 percentage points more likely to favour spending for environmental protection. At the same time, they are also 6 percentage points less likely to support agricultural or military spending. In addition, they are also more supportive of health and welfare spending than men. As such, women and men have very different preferences for the composition of government spending.

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An interesting exercise would be to compare our estimates with results obtained from the most similar survey using hypothetical questions.

As it turns out, the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) wave six ("Role of Government", 1996) asks the following question, which is in the spirit of our last analysis on government spending: "There are various areas of government spending. Please tell me for each of them whether you would like to see more or less government spending in each area. Remember that if you say "much more", it might require a tax increase to pay for it." Surveyed subjects are all older than 18, which correspond precisely to the surveyed individuals in the VOX-samples. We could match the following policy areas: the environment, health, education, the military and defense and unemployment benefits. We then run regressions using as dependent variable an indicator equal to

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<sup>6</sup> We could have added a category culture, but the votes are the same as the ones already analyzed in Table 3.

one if a person says: much more or more spending; the variable is zero otherwise. As independent variables, we include the gender dummy and the same control variables we use in our analysis of the ballot data.

Table 6 reveals few gender gaps in the ISSP survey; apart from the policy areas defense and health, the size of the estimated coefficients are small (note e.g. the stark contrast to the VOX results on environmental spending). As such, hypothetical survey questions may not be well suited to identify gender gaps in policy preferences, either because survey respondents have little incentives to think seriously about the subject, or because the survey questions remain too vague on how the additional spending would be actually financed.

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Given that we do not find large gender gaps for total spending, can we conclude that women are then only marginally more inclined to accept costly projects than men? Since Lott and Kenny's (1999) influential article on women suffrage and the size of government, there has been a vivid debate on whether political involvement of women increases government spending or not. Other evidence suggests in contrast, that women are more in favour of a balanced budget than men (Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986; see also Krogstrup and Wälti, 2011).

Our data allow us to analyse directly whether women, at the ballot box, say more frequently yes than men to projects that increase government spending.<sup>7</sup> As mentioned before, the gender gap in approval of costly projects at the ballot box is a mere 2.5 percentage point. Note further that actual spending is only affected by women's political participation if the proposition is approved by the voters and women changed the final outcome, i.e. they proved to be pivotal. Among all federal ballots between 1981 and 2003, women and men had approved different outcomes in fifteen votes (see Table 7). Women changed the result in their favour in only four cases or about two percent of the 202 propositions over that period. From these four pivotal votes, only two had clear-cut fiscal implications.

Based on the information provided by the federal government before the vote, we can get a rough estimate of the consequences of these two fiscally relevant votes. Women's opposition to a reduction in unemployment benefits increased federal spending by about 70 million Swiss Francs per year. However, women were also in favour of abolishing subsidies for parking spaces, which saved the federal government about 20 million Swiss Francs per year. Relative to the 46 billion federal expenditures in 1999, the change in voting outcomes by women adds up to a mere 0.1 percent increase in federal spending.

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## 6. Policy Implications and Conclusion

This paper identifies gender gaps in policy preferences as revealed at the ballot box. We focus on Switzerland, where citizens regularly decide on all relevant issues due to extensive direct democratic rights.

We find strong evidence that women and men support a different allocation of government resources. In particular, we show that female voters care more about the environment, public health, social welfare and are more skeptical towards nuclear energy or the military. If we focus on the fiscal consequences of women expressing their preferences in ballots, we find that gender gaps in approval of costly projects are quite large in specific policy areas (10 percentage point difference in approval of environmental projects), but comparatively small (2.5 percentage points) when it comes to the overall size of government.

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<sup>7</sup> It is possible however, that women might have influence spending through at least two other channels: first, the composition of the parliament by electing different representatives or different parties. Second, women can also affect policies directly by proposing initiatives that support their policies.

Knowing that women prefer different policies than men, is there a role for legal intervention? At first sight, one could argue that independent of legislator's gender, electoral competition ensures implementation of the median voters' preferences and as such, women's preferences get adequately represented in purely representative democracies as well. However, recent research suggests a role for legislators' identity in policymaking (e.g. Washington, 2008), and a legislator's gender may then matter. This result then raises the issue how many female legislators are needed to get an adequate representation of women's preferences. Traditionally, the number of female legislators has been low; as mentioned in the introduction, only one out of five representatives in national parliaments is a woman. If a low share of female legislators reflects voter preferences (e.g. a preference for male legislators) or women have a high disutility from running as candidates, it is not obvious why a gender quota is needed.

Yet, latest research on the reasons for the low share of female legislators in Spain reaches a very different conclusion. The study finds that women are willing to run as candidates; furthermore, voters are no more likely to dislike female legislators than male legislators. The empirical evidence suggests instead that male party members discriminate against women by either not putting them on the lists, or by putting them in disadvantaged positions on those lists – even if this is suboptimal for the party's electoral outcome (Casas-Arce and Saiz, 2011). If such discriminatory practices by male party members prevail in other countries and settings as well, a well-designed gender quota could improve the representation of women's preferences in the political arena.

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## Appendix: Description of the votes with the largest gender gaps

1. Reduction Tobacco Consumption (Initiative)  
Vote held November 28, 1993; Vote Nr. 404; Turnout: 45.5%; Share-Yes: 25.5%  
Goal Initiative: To prohibit advertisement for tobacco. To use 1% of the revenues from taxing tobacco to educate about the health consequences of tobacco consumption.
2. Equal Representation of Women in Federal Government (Initiative)  
Vote held March 12, 2000; Vote Nr. 461; Turnout: 42.2%; Share-Yes: 18%  
Goal Initiative: Adjust the stuffing policy of the federal government to guarantee equal chances for men and women. No direct financial consequences indicated.
3. Change in Marital Law (Referendum)  
Vote held September 22, 1985; Vote Nr. 336; Turnout: 41.1%; Share-Yes: 54.7%  
Goal Law: Change the marital law to explicitly state that husbands and wives have equal rights and obligations. Housework and childcare are considered as a fulltime contribution to the family maintenance.  
No financial consequences indicated.
4. Against Racial Discrimination (Referendum)

Vote held September 25, 1994; Vote Nr. 414; Turnout: 45.9%; Share-Yes: 54.6%

Goal Law: Change of the Law (Civil law and Military law) to prosecute persons who engage actively in promoting discrimination based on race, ethnicity, or religion. No financial consequences indicated.

5. Against Subsidies for Corn Production (Referendum)

Vote held September 25, 1994; Vote Nr. 413; Turnout: 45.5%; Share-Yes: 64.6%

Goal Federal Resolution: To reduce the subsidies for corn production. Initially, the government bought corn from the Swiss corn producers at higher (than market) prices to maintain a high level of domestic production for situations of crises like wars. To the mills, the government sold at (cheaper) foreign prices, which involved substantial costs.

6. Reduction of Alcohol Consumption (Initiative)

Vote held November 28, 1993; Vote Nr. 403; Turnout: 45.5%; Share-Yes: 25.3%

Goal Initiative: Prohibit Advertisement for Alcohol. Fiscal Consequences: Higher taxes on alcohol.

7. Protection of Rivers and Lakes (Initiative)

Vote held Mai 17, 1992; Vote Nr. 381; Turnout: 39.2%; Share-Yes: 37.1%

Goal Initiative: Protection of rivers and lakes, major objectives are the following: to protect human beings and animals, to secure the portable water supply, to protect the living space for flora and fauna, and to secure the water supply for agricultural purposes.

Financial consequences, as indicated in the election documents: Once the law comes into effect (1992), the average costs for the government will be around 100 million SF per year (170 million Swiss Francs in the beginning, 40 million Swiss Francs after that)

8. For a Car free Sunday per Quarter (Initiative)

Vote held Mai 18, 2003; Vote Nr. 498; Turnout: 49.8%; Share-Yes: 37.6%

Goal Initiative: For the next four years, there should be one Sunday per season where private motorized vehicles are only permitted in exceptional circumstances (e.g. ambulances).

9. For Abandoning Nuclear Energy (Initiative)

Vote held September 23, 1990; Vote Nr. 365; Turnout: 40.4%; Share-Yes: 47.1%

Goal Initiative: No further implementation of nuclear plants No fiscal major fiscal implications, potentially an increase unemployment in the nuclear sector.

10. For Equal Rights of the Disabled (Initiative)

Vote held Mai 18, 2003; Vote Nr. 500; Turnout: 49.7%; Share-Yes: 37.7%

Goal Initiative: Equal rights for disabled people and abolishment of any sort of existing discrimination. Furthermore, where financially feasible, the entrances of public buildings and facilities should be made handicapped accessible.

Fiscal consequences in case of acceptance: Costs for reconstruction and renovation (2-4 million Swiss Francs, 10 million Swiss Francs for the reconstruction of universities; further costs for other infrastructure possible).

--- insert Tables A1 – A4 about here ---

**Table 1: Summary Statistics**

	<u>Women</u>		<u>Men</u>		T Statistic Difference
	Mean	Std. Dev	Mean	Std. Dev	
<u>Demographics</u>					
Age	48.39	16.38	49.98	17.41	14.92
Protestant	0.47	0.50	0.47	0.50	-1.08
Have Kids	0.41	0.49	0.33	0.47	-13.74
Single	0.19	0.39	0.23	0.42	15.57
Married	0.66	0.47	0.71	0.45	16.14
Divorced	0.05	0.21	0.03	0.17	-12.02
<u>Education, Work and Income</u>					
Compulsory Education	0.19	0.40	0.10	0.30	-44.52
Apprentice/Spec Schools	0.74	0.44	0.77	0.42	13.54
University Education	0.07	0.26	0.13	0.34	31.86
Employed	0.51	0.50	0.69	0.46	57.72
Income	1.76	0.82	2.21	1.06	13.34
House Ownership	0.46	0.50	0.50	0.50	9.88
<u>Knowledge Vote</u>					
Well Informed about Vote	0.74	0.44	0.82	0.39	37.90
<u>Region of Residence</u>					
Urban	0.66	0.47	0.64	0.48	-6.77
French-/Italian-Speaking Canton	0.26	0.44	0.24	0.43	-4.53
<u>Political Participation</u>					
Turnout: 1984-2003	0.54	0.50	0.62	0.48	32.72
Turnout 80's (1984-1993)	0.54	0.50	0.64	0.48	25.98
Turnout 90's (1994-2003)	0.54	0.50	0.61	0.49	20.79

*Notes:* The summary statistics are shown for the sample of voters (except for political participation). Age is measured in years, while protestant is a binary indicator. The existence of children is also measured by a binary indicator. Single, married and divorced are binary indicators describing the civil status of the respondent. Education is a binary indicator for the highest degree of a person either from compulsory school, vocational school or technical college/university. Employment is a binary indicator equal to one if the person is employed and zero if she is non- or unemployed. Income measures household income in 5 income classes. House ownership is a binary variable equal to one if the household owns a house and zero otherwise. Well informed is equal to 1 if the respondent could correctly answer questions about the respective ballot. Both urban residence and the dominant language in the canton of residence are binary indicators. The last column shows the T-test statistic for differences in means between men and women.

*Source:* VOX surveys, 1981-2003.

**Table 2: Federal Propositions with the Largest Gender Gap**

Title of Proposition	Vote Number	Year of Vote	Gender Gap (%)
Reduction of Tobacco Consumption	404	1993	17.7
Equal Representation of Women in Federal Government	461	2000	17.5
Change in Marital Law	336	1985	17.0
Against Racial Discrimination	414	1994	16.8
Against Subsidies for Corn Production	413	1994	15.6
Reduction of Alcohol Consumption	403	1993	15.5
For Protection of Rivers and Lakes	381	1992	15.3
For a Car Free Sunday per Quarter	498	2003	14.9
For Abandoning Nuclear Energy	365	1990	14.7
For Equal Rights of the Disabled	500	2003	14.6

*Notes:* The second column reports the official number of the vote and the third column the year the vote was held. The last column shows the gender gap, the percentage of women approving the proposition minus the percentage of men. Positive numbers imply that women were more supportive of the proposition than men.

*Source:* VOX Surveys, 1981-2003, Sample of Voters.

**Table 3: Voting Behavior of Men and Women**

	<i>International Affairs</i>			<i>Military</i>	<i>Environment</i>			<i>Transport</i>			<i>Agriculture</i>		<i>Legal</i>		
	Pro Joining International Organizations	Against Foreign Immigration	Pro Foreign Immigration	Less Military	Protection of the Environment	Against Nuclear Energy	Against further Road Construction	Pro Speed Limits	Against Speed Limits	Against Subsidies Parking	Pro Public Transport	Against Subsidies Agriculture	Pro Liberalizing Agriculture	Equal Rights Women and Men	More Direct Democracy
Female Dummy	0.0120 (0.0211)	-0.0905*** (0.0309)	0.0875** (0.0420)	0.0494** (0.0248)	0.0769*** (0.0158)	0.107*** (0.0219)	0.0294 (0.0240)	0.0550* (0.0325)	-0.0670 (0.0495)	0.0863 (0.0804)	0.00169 (0.0276)	0.114*** (0.0378)	-0.0112 (0.0274)	0.220*** (0.0385)	0.0337 (0.0295)
University Education	0.209*** (0.0336)	-0.218*** (0.0357)	0.361*** (0.0257)	0.125*** (0.0399)	0.129*** (0.0243)	0.0627* (0.0362)	0.0726* (0.0401)	0.0905 (0.0590)	-0.0635 (0.0797)	0.174 (0.115)	0.153*** (0.0389)	0.185*** (0.0628)	-0.0272 (0.0437)	0.114* (0.0638)	-0.0334 (0.0424)
Married	0.0214 (0.0224)	-0.0128 (0.0346)	-0.0671 (0.0458)	-0.0211 (0.0268)	-0.0104 (0.0172)	-0.0164 (0.0238)	-0.152*** (0.0263)	0.00943 (0.0333)	0.0235 (0.0533)	-0.154* (0.0928)	0.0223 (0.0301)	-0.0230 (0.0431)	0.0834*** (0.0305)	-0.0247 (0.0425)	-0.0239 (0.0321)
Houseowner	-0.00725 (0.0221)	0.0404 (0.0327)	-0.00545 (0.0453)	-0.0867*** (0.0255)	-0.0784*** (0.0163)	-0.0742*** (0.0238)	-0.0399* (0.0235)	-0.0306 (0.0310)	0.0813 (0.0542)	0.0197 (0.0782)	-0.0622** (0.0284)	0.0294 (0.0418)	0.117*** (0.0282)	-0.162*** (0.0389)	0.0481 (0.0302)
Employed	0.0638*** (0.0245)	0.00801 (0.0373)	-0.0918** (0.0451)	0.0519* (0.0302)	-0.0371** (0.0181)	0.0244 (0.0252)	-0.0281 (0.0261)	0.0230 (0.0337)	0.0205 (0.0565)	0.0749 (0.0967)	-0.0524 (0.0329)	-0.0540 (0.0422)	0.0306 (0.0306)	0.0152 (0.0448)	-0.0513 (0.0349)
Age	-0.00133* (0.000710)	0.00222** (0.00113)	-0.00461*** (0.00142)	-0.00517*** (0.000889)	-0.00389*** (0.000534)	-0.00366*** (0.000744)	-0.00181** (0.000762)	-0.000842 (0.00102)	0.00105 (0.00170)	0.00302 (0.00274)	0.00136 (0.000950)	0.00120 (0.00130)	-0.00231** (0.000926)	-0.000607 (0.00126)	-0.00299*** (0.00101)
Protestant	0.00499 (0.0223)	-0.000855 (0.0332)	0.0360 (0.0465)	-0.0522** (0.0261)	-0.00356 (0.0167)	-0.0471* (0.0241)	-0.00679 (0.0258)	-0.0274 (0.0331)	0.00938 (0.0540)	0.144* (0.0827)	-0.0543* (0.0301)	0.0233 (0.0446)	0.0832*** (0.0293)	-0.0863** (0.0396)	-0.0496 (0.0304)
Number of Ballots	5	3	1	5	9	5	4	1	1	1	3	2	4	3	4
Ballot Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Canton Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,833	1,038	569	2,089	4,838	2,377	1,969	670	505	204	1,472	688	1,770	941	1,548
Log-Likelihood	-1617.96	-625.60	-309.71	-1182.49	-2880.52	-1501.85	-1154.24	-309.60	-319.56	-123.23	-899.35	-412.33	-1020.10	-460.26	-804.66

*Notes:* The table reports marginal effects from a probit model. The dependent variable is the voting decision, which is equal to one if the respondent supported the proposition and zero otherwise for the respective propositions shown in the column header. The table reports the coefficient on the female dummy. All specifications include canton and ballot fixed effects. Controls for socio-demographics are included as well (all controls except age are binary variables). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficients with \*\*\* are significant at the 1 percent level, while those with \*\* (\*) are significant at the 5 (10) percent level. The last row reports the value of the log-likelihood function.

*Source:* Authors' calculations.

Table 3 (continued): Voting Behavior of Men and Women

	<i>Health</i>			<i>Education</i>				<i>Welfare</i>			<i>Culture and Leisure</i>		<i>Living</i>		
	Subsidies Health Insurance	Pro Liberalizing Drugs	Against Tobacco/ Alcohol	Against Gen-Tech/ Animal Test.	Pro Legalize Abortion	Cheaper Hospitals/ Pharma-Prod.	Free Education	Reduce Unempl. Benefits	Decrease Retirement Age	Increase Retirement Age	Support for the Disabled	Longer Maternity Leave	More Culture	More Leisure	Pro Cheap Housing
Female Dummy	0.038 (0.032)	-0.0164 (0.0323)	0.163*** (0.0263)	0.0825*** (0.0236)	-0.0299 (0.0409)	-0.0388* (0.0226)	0.002 (0.068)	-0.0488 (0.0350)	0.0621*** (0.0237)	-0.0431 (0.0482)	0.137*** (0.0474)	0.0513* (0.0283)	0.0868* (0.0445)	0.0102 (0.0332)	0.0109 (0.0458)
University Education	0.031 (0.053)	0.119** (0.0494)	0.140*** (0.0505)	-0.0150 (0.0352)	0.128** (0.0544)	0.0354 (0.0381)		0.0571 (0.0462)	0.000506 (0.0366)	0.137** (0.0627)	0.0208 (0.0691)	0.208*** (0.0541)	0.337*** (0.0428)	-0.0243 (0.0554)	-0.0388 (0.0651)
Married	-0.007 (0.034)	-0.0578 (0.0374)	-0.00558 (0.0276)	-0.0321 (0.0259)	-0.0161 (0.0446)	0.00808 (0.0234)	-0.044 (0.066)	-0.0564 (0.0369)	0.0108 (0.0258)	-0.0611 (0.0518)	-0.0447 (0.0531)	-0.0430 (0.0305)	-0.149*** (0.0470)	0.0122 (0.0362)	-0.0674 (0.0506)
Houseowner	-0.084 (0.033)**	0.00828 (0.0346)	-0.0256 (0.0271)	-0.0335 (0.0246)	0.0576 (0.0428)	-0.0345 (0.0221)	-0.14 (0.065)**	0.0730** (0.0347)	-0.0711*** (0.0241)	0.165*** (0.0487)	-0.0968* (0.0516)	-0.0393 (0.0290)	0.0739 (0.0469)	-0.102*** (0.0344)	-0.293*** (0.0465)
Employed	-0.016 (0.036)	0.0956** (0.0380)	0.000851 (0.0281)	0.0197 (0.0265)	0.166*** (0.0473)	0.0243 (0.0242)	-0.177 (0.076)**	0.0236 (0.0389)	0.0261 (0.0283)	-0.128** (0.0579)	-0.0405 (0.0557)	-0.0176 (0.0315)	-0.00716 (0.0493)	0.0917** (0.0375)	0.0697 (0.0509)
Age	0 (0.001)	-0.00385*** (0.00120)	0.00258*** (0.000770)	-0.00117 (0.000785)	-0.000874 (0.00135)	9.02e-05 (0.000740)	0 (0.002)	0.00394*** (0.00112)	-0.00212** (0.000877)	0.00131 (0.00171)	-0.000918 (0.00169)	-0.00516*** (0.000965)	-0.00334** (0.00149)	-0.00401*** (0.00109)	0.00136 (0.00154)
Protestant	0.006 (0.033)	0.0263 (0.0353)	-0.0248 (0.0275)	-0.0223 (0.0251)	0.169*** (0.0424)	-1.74e-05 (0.0229)	0.006 (0.072)	0.0613* (0.0365)	-0.0512** (0.0250)	0.0286 (0.0506)	-0.0848* (0.0508)	-0.0730** (0.0291)	-0.0516 (0.0493)	-0.0253 (0.0354)	-0.0352 (0.0490)
Number of Ballots	2	2	2	4	1	2	1	2	4	1	1	2	2	4	1
Ballot Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Canton Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	949	1,127	1,112	2,144	517	1,107	252	952	1,995	491	508	1,450	556	1,334	522
Log-Likelihood	-525.80	-668.00	-539.11	-1302.15	-267.49	-449.83	-138.26	-507.46	-1254.93	-298.05	-322.91	-847.63	-326.30	-612.76	-297.16

Notes: The table reports marginal effects from a probit model. The dependent variable is the voting decision, which is equal to one if the respondent supported the proposition and zero otherwise for the respective propositions shown in the column header. The table reports the coefficient on the female dummy. All specifications include canton and ballot fixed effects. Controls for socio-demographics are included as well (all controls except age are binary variables). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficients with \*\*\* are significant at the 1 percent level, while those with \*\* (\*) are significant at the 5 (10) percent level. The last row reports the value of the log-likelihood function.

Source: Authors' calculations.

**Table 4: Robustness to Income**

	<i>International Affairs</i>		<i>Military</i>	<i>Environment</i>		<i>Transport</i>		<i>Agriculture</i>		<i>Legal</i>			
	Pro Joining International Organizations	Against Foreign Immigration	Pro Foreign Immigration	Less Military	Protection of the Environment	Against Nuclear Energy	Pro Speed Limits	Against Subsidies Parking	Pro Public Transport	Against Subsidies Agriculture	Pro Liberalizing Agriculture	Equal Rights Women and Men	More Direct Democracy
<b><u>Baseline Estimates for Votes with Household-Income</u></b>													
Female Dummy	0.0269 (0.0255)	-0.0905*** (0.0309)	0.0875** (0.0420)	0.0270 (0.0310)	0.0633*** (0.0179)	0.0650** (0.0328)	0.0550* (0.0325)	0.0863 (0.0804)	0.0265 (0.0434)	0.177*** (0.0442)	-0.0112 (0.0274)	0.206*** (0.0392)	0.0274 (0.0329)
	2,000	1,038	569	1,430	3,298	1,066	670	204	502	491	1,770	450	1,137
<b><u>Control for Education-Category Dummies</u></b>													
Female Dummy	0.0666** (0.0266)	-0.101*** (0.0317)	0.126*** (0.0434)	0.0205 (0.0317)	0.0819*** (0.0185)	0.0690** (0.0338)	0.0562* (0.0331)	0.118 (0.0856)	0.0314 (0.0441)	0.205*** (0.0457)	-0.0142 (0.0275)	0.220*** (0.0397)	0.0145 (0.0340)
	2,000	1,038	569	1,430	3,298	1,066	670	204	502	491	1,770	450	1,137
<b><u>Control for Household-Income</u></b>													
Female Dummy	0.0713** (0.0295)	-0.134*** (0.0340)	0.223*** (0.0473)	0.0352 (0.0339)	0.0898*** (0.0214)	0.110*** (0.0365)	0.0525 (0.0380)	0.107 (0.101)	0.0650 (0.0489)	0.185*** (0.0551)	-0.0241 (0.0329)	0.209*** (0.0447)	0.0172 (0.0377)
	1,680	901	397	1,231	2,369	933	547	160	431	332	1,252	365	971
<b><u>Married Couples Only (All Votes)</u></b>													
Female Dummy	0.0650** (0.0282)	-0.0865** (0.0401)	0.102 (0.0652)	0.0499 (0.0324)	0.0807*** (0.0205)	0.0980*** (0.0286)	0.0244 (0.0435)	0.117 (0.116)	-0.0111 (0.0355)	0.211*** (0.0531)	-0.0423 (0.0340)	0.214*** (0.0494)	0.0386 (0.0390)
	1,915	720	367	1,435	3,413	1,594	436	144	1,017	453	1,296	653	1,086

*Notes:* The table reports marginal effects from a probit model. The dependent variable is the voting decision, which is equal to one if the respondent supported the proposition and zero otherwise for the respective propositions shown in the column header. The table reports the coefficient on the female dummy. All specifications include canton and ballot fixed effects and the controls included in Table 3. The first row reports the baseline estimates underlying Table 3 for the restricted sample of votes where household income is available (i.e. votes after 1993). The second row adds dummies for each educational category. The third row adds a measure for household income. The last row restricts the sample to married survey-respondents (for the whole sample of votes). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficients with \*\*\* are significant at the 1 percent level, while those with \*\* (\*) are significant at the 5 (10) percent level.

**Table 4 (continued): Robustness to Income**

	<i>Health</i>				<i>Welfare</i>					<i>Culture and Leisure</i>			<i>Living</i>	
	Subsidies Health Insurance	Pro Liberalizing Drugs	Against Tobacco/ Alcohol	Against Gen-Tech/ Animal Test.	Pro Legalize Abortion	Cheaper Hospitals/ Pharma-Prod.	Reduce Unempl. Benefits	Decrease Retirement Age	Increase Retirement Age	Support for the Disabled	Longer Maternity Leave	More Culture	More Leisure	Pro Cheap Housing
<b><i>Baseline Estimates for Votes with Household-Income</i></b>														
Female Dummy	0.0300 (0.0359)	-0.0164 (0.0323)	0.163*** (0.0263)	0.132*** (0.0428)	-0.0299 (0.0409)	-0.0388* (0.0226)	-0.121** (0.0497)	0.0529** (0.0206)	-0.0431 (0.0482)	0.137*** (0.0474)	0.0563 (0.0450)	0.0868* (0.0445)	-0.0179 (0.0318)	0.0109 (0.0458)
	505	1,127	1,112	550	517	1,107	515	2,500	491	508	635	556	664	522
<b><i>Control for Education-Category Dummies</i></b>														
Female Dummy	0.0267 (0.0359)	-0.00167 (0.0334)	0.173*** (0.0269)	0.121*** (0.0440)	-0.0243 (0.0417)	-0.0351 (0.0235)	-0.123** (0.0510)	0.0450** (0.0210)	-0.0368 (0.0492)	0.122** (0.0490)	0.0775 (0.0473)	0.120*** (0.0462)	-0.0127 (0.0334)	0.0141 (0.0466)
	505	1,127	1,112	550	517	1,107	515	2,500	491	508	635	556	664	522
<b><i>Control for Household-Income</i></b>														
Female Dummy	0.0468 (0.0417)	0.00443 (0.0372)	0.160*** (0.0288)	0.162*** (0.0469)	-0.0440 (0.0449)	-0.0155 (0.0258)	-0.139*** (0.0535)	0.0519** (0.0238)	-0.0885 (0.0616)	0.137** (0.0542)	0.0490 (0.0513)	0.228*** (0.0534)	-0.0447 (0.0360)	0.0758 (0.0516)
	350	957	1,002	487	434	962	478	2,051	348	428	542	386	575	455
<b><i>Married Couples Only (All Votes)</i></b>														
Female Dummy	0.0343 (0.0411)	0.0376 (0.0413)	0.217*** (0.0416)	0.0796** (0.0310)	-0.0726 (0.0490)	-0.0110 (0.0305)	-0.0477 (0.0453)	0.0458* (0.0261)	0.0637 (0.0620)	0.145** (0.0643)	0.0260 (0.0355)	0.174*** (0.0649)	0.0165 (0.0453)	-0.0604 (0.0586)
	645	818	666	1,484	365	748	651	1,765	335	350	1,044	356	912	342

Notes: The table reports marginal effects from a probit model. The dependent variable is the voting decision, which is equal to one if the respondent supported the proposition and zero otherwise for the respective propositions shown in the column header. The table reports the coefficient on the female dummy. All specifications include canton and ballot fixed effects and the controls included in Table 3. The first row reports the baseline estimates underlying Table 3 for the restricted sample of votes where household income is available (i.e. votes after 1993). The second row adds dummies for each educational category. The third row adds a measure for household income. The last row restricts the sample to married survey-respondents (for the whole sample of votes). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficients with \*\*\* are significant at the 1 percent level, while those with \*\* (\*) are significant at the 5 (10) percent level.

**Table 5: Support for Higher Expenditures in Federal Propositions**

	<i>Size of Government</i>		<i>Scope of Government</i>						
	More Government	Less Debt	More Environment	More Transport	More Defense	More Agriculture	More Education	More Health	More Welfare
Female Dummy	0.025 (0.008)***	-0.031 (0.019)	0.1 (0.028)***	0.016 (0.016)	-0.064 (0.023)***	-0.073 (0.026)***	0.117 (0.058)**	0.062 (0.025)**	0.064 (0.016)***
University Education	0.145 (0.012)***	-0.006 (0.033)	-0.053 (0.045)	0.187 (0.021)***	-0.094 (0.037)**	-0.101 (0.043)**	0.154 (0.103)	0.109 (0.044)**	-0.024 (0.025)
Married	-0.025 (0.008)***	0.014 (0.021)	-0.037 (0.031)	-0.026 (0.017)	-0.001 (0.024)	-0.011 (0.029)	-0.037 (0.062)	-0.008 (0.026)	-0.002 (0.017)
Houseowner	-0.035 (0.008)***	0.03 (0.02)	-0.099 (0.029)***	-0.016 (0.016)	0.066 (0.023)***	0.008 (0.028)	-0.182 (0.060)***	-0.068 (0.025)***	-0.087 (0.016)***
Employed	-0.035 (0.009)***	-0.058 (0.021)***	-0.069 (0.031)**	-0.054 (0.018)***	0.022 (0.027)	0.026 (0.029)	0.126 (0.061)**	-0.021 (0.027)	0.013 (0.019)
Age	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.005 (0.001)***	0.002 (0.001)***	0.006 (0.001)***	0.001 (0.001)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.003 (0.001)***
Protestant	-0.02 (0.008)**	0.028 (0.021)	-0.008 (0.03)	-0.062 (0.017)***	0.088 (0.024)***	0.003 (0.029)	0.08 (0.057)	-0.011 (0.026)	-0.04 (0.017)**
Number of Ballots	49	5	3	7	5	5	3	4	9
Ballot Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Canton Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	20,448	2,150	1,529	4,087	2,150	1,531	387	1,720	4,427
Log Likelihood	-12725.0	-1101.3	-855.4	-2408.2	-1273.9	-877.4	-238.1	-1009.0	-2793.7

*Notes:* The table reports the marginal effects from a probit model whether the respondent supported a proposition which would have increased government spending in the respective policy area or opposed it. The classification of the financial consequences of the propositions is based on the official documents distributed by the Swiss government before the vote (see main text). Appendix Table 4 shows a list of the federal propositions underlying each column. The table reports the coefficient on the female dummy variable in each column. The controls are the same as in Table 3. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.

*Source:* Authors' calculations.

**Table 6: Support for Higher Expenditures in the ISSP Survey**

	<i>Scope of Government</i>				
	More Environment	More Defense	More Education	More Health	More Redistribution
Female Dummy	-0.0047 (0.0476)	-0.0406** (0.0181)	-0.0139 (0.0432)	0.0516 (0.0478)	0.0202 (0.0404)
Canton Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	484	485	484	485	483
Log-Likelihood	-313.2	-84.8	-290.5	-310.5	-267.1

*Notes:* The sample consists of survey respondents who indicate to have voted in the last federal election. The table reports the marginal effects from a probit model where the dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent supports more government spending in the specific policy area (1 if yes, 0 if not). The table reports the coefficient on the female dummy variable in each column. The controls are dummy variables for marital and employment status, religion (1 if protestant, 0 otherwise), age and a dummy for living in an urban area. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.

*Source:* International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), Wave 6 ("Role of Government")

**Table 7: Propositions where Men and Women had accepted Different Outcomes**

Title of Proposition	Year of Vote	Women Yes	Men Yes	Outcome
Ecological and Modern Agriculture	1995	44.4	50.2	No
Easier Access to Swiss Real Estate for Non-Residents	1995	43.3	55.4	No
Abolish Subsidies for Parking Spaces at Train Stations	1996	51.8	41.2	Yes
For a Sustainable Unemployment Insurance	1997	38.9	52.1	No
New Regulation Fuel Tariffs	1983	48.1	57.0	Yes
Introduction of Civil Service	1984	51.8	44.6	No
Reduce Property Sales, especially to Non-Residents	1984	50.9	48.4	No
Stop Construction of Nuclear Power Plants	1984	53.9	47.7	No
Stop Use of Nuclear Energy	1990	58.0	43.3	No
Reducing Animal Testing	1992	55.4	41.7	No
For an Ecological Military	1993	51.3	42.9	No
Against Fighter Planes	1993	52.1	43.4	No
Flexible Retirement Age 62 for Men and Women	2000	50.4	43.6	No
For Equal Rights of the Disabled	2003	55.1	40.5	No
Stop Construction of Nuclear Power Plants	2003	50.4	44.0	No

*Notes:* The third and fourth columns show the percentage of women and men voting in favor of the proposition respectively. The last column shows the official outcome of the federal proposition. The first four rows show the votes where women changed the result. The other rows report the votes, in which men were decisive.

*Source:* VOX Surveys, 1981-2003.

**Appendix Table 1: Votes, Gender Gaps and Survey Accuracy**

Year	Title of the Proposition	Vote Nr.	Gender Gaps	Pvalues	Pol. Area
1993	Initiative for Reducing Problems with Tobacco	404	17.71	0.65	PRO HEALTH
2000	Initiative «for a fair Representation of Women in the Government»	461	17.49	0.53	EQUAL
1985	Marriage and Inheritance Law	336	17.04	0.00	EQUAL
1994	Swiss Criminal Code on Military Law	414	16.86	0.05	
1994	Against Subsidies for Corn Production	413	15.58	0.98	AGRI SUB
1993	Initiative for Reducing Problems with Alcohol	403	15.55	0.47	PRO HEALTH
1992	Initiative for Saving the Waters	381	15.26	0.46	ENV
2003	For a car-free Sunday per Quarter	498	14.92	0.22	ENV
1990	Initiative against Nuclear Energy	365	14.72	0.19	CONTRA NUC
2003	Initiative «Equal Rights for Disabled»	500	14.62	0.00	PRO DISABLED
1981	Equal Rights for Women and Men	306	14.55	0.00	EQUAL
1987	For Protection of the Swiss Moors	349	14.23	0.00	ENV
1992	Initiative for Restricting Animal Testing	374	13.65	0.04	CONTRA GEN
1997	Federal Resolution on Financing the Unemployment Insurance	437	-13.23	0.13	UNEMPL
1990	Initiative against Nuclear Power Plants	366	13.20	0.00	CONTRA NUC
1999	Initiative «Proprietary for Everybody»	451	13.19	0.99	
1986	For joining the United Nations Organizations	338	12.22	0.06	INT
1995	Law on Aquisition of Property through Foreigners	424	-12.05	0.26	
2003	Federal Resolution on Changes of Citizens' Rights	493	11.66	0.06	DD
1985	Against the Use of Animals for Scientific Purposes	337	11.49	0.04	
1987	Law on Health Insurance	350	11.11	0.01	PRO MOTHER
1994	Federal Resolution on the Promotion of Culture	410	10.92	0.00	MORE CULT
1998	Initiative «for Protection against Gen-Manipulation»	440	10.91	0.80	CONTRA GEN
2000	Initiative for Restricting Immigration	467	-10.86	0.00	LESS FOR
1985	For a Coordinated Start of Schools	334	10.74	0.01	
1998	Initiative «10th Revision Age Insurance without increasing the Retirement Age»	444	10.69	0.51	CONTRA RET
1989.5	For higher Speed Limits 130/100	358	-10.57	0.00	PRO SPEED
1996	Against Federal Subsidies for Parking Spaces	429	10.54	0.01	SUB PARKING
2002	Law on the Electricity Market	490	-10.51	0.00	
1991	Initiative for Promoting Public Transportation	370	10.36	0.12	PUB TRANS
1996	Federal Resolution on the Revision of the Language Article	425	10.29	0.10	
1992	Law on Protection of the Waters	377	9.55	0.00	ENV
1994	For easier Naturalization of Immigrants	411	9.47	0.00	PRO FOR
1991	Federal Resolution on the Coordination on Traffic Policy	371	-9.43	0.45	
2001	Initiative for Low Pharmaceutical Prices	475	-9.37	0.00	CHEAP PHARMA
1993	Federal Resolution on the Union of the community Laufen with the Canton BS	395	9.36	0.00	
1985	Abolish Charges for Primary School	326	-9.18	0.55	
1996	Initiative against Illegal Immigration	432	-9.02	0.00	
1987	Initiative for Direct Democracy in Military Expenses	346	9.00	0.27	
1983	Regulation of Custom's Duty of Fuel	312	-8.92	0.85	
2000	Initiative «Saving in the Military»	471	8.91	0.59	LESS MILITARY
1992	Law on Stamp Duties	384	-8.88	0.12	
1993	Initiative "For a Switzerland without new Figher Jets"	393	8.76	0.02	LESS MILITARY
1992	Initiative for a cheap Health Insurance	373	8.75	0.33	SUB HEALTH-INS.
1993	Pro Environmental Protection in the Army	392	8.37	0.32	
1994	Law on mandatory measures in Immigration Law	417	-8.19	0.85	
1993	Federal Resolution on Misuse of Arms	394	8.14	0.00	
1985	Right to Live	330	7.78	0.01	
1993	Initiative against Animal Experiments	391	7.57	0.23	CONTRA GEN
1994	Law on the Health Insurance	415	-7.54	0.00	
1990	Federal Resolution on Building Vines	363	-7.50	0.01	
1987	Law on Residence of Foreigners	345	-7.35	0.41	
1990	Initiative for Restricting Road Making	359	7.18	0.51	LESS ROAD
1984	Civil Service	318	7.14	0.00	
1992	Federal Resolution on Building the Swiss Railway	382	-7.01	0.10	PUB TRANS
1994	Initiative for Protection of the Alps	408	6.98	0.09	ENV
2000	Initiative «against Manipulations in the Technology of Reproduction»	462	6.89	0.64	
1985	Venture Capital for Small and Middle-Sized Enterprises	335	6.89	0.93	
2000	Initiative «for a flexible Retirement Age»	470	6.87	0.73	CONTRA RET
1998	Federal Law regulating working conditions	448	-6.85	0.46	
1986	For secured Education	340	6.83	0.00	EDU
1998	Law on user-dependent heavy Traffic Charge	442	-6.67	0.02	
1993	Initiative "For a Federal Holiday on August 1"	396	6.45	0.03	MORE LEIS
1997	Initiative «Against Exporting Arms»	435	6.42	0.05	
2002	Law Regulating Abortion	487	-6.41	0.81	ABORTION
2003	Initiative «For Restricting Nuclear Risks»	502	6.38	0.01	CONTRA NUC
2000	Initiative «for a flexible Age Insurance»	469	6.33	0.04	CONTRA RET
1998	Initiative «S.o.S. - Schweiz ohne Schnüffelpolizei»	441	6.31	0.06	
2000	Initiative «for cutting motorized Road Traffic into Half»	463	6.29	0.78	ENV
1984	Nuclear Power Plants	321	6.21	0.10	CONTRA NUC
2000	Initiative «More rights for the people»	468	-6.03	0.19	DD

1992	Law on Business Transactions	383	-5.86	0.00	
1992	Salaries Parliamentary Members	386	-5.86	0.00	
1992	Compensations Parliamentary Members	387	-5.86	0.06	
1985	Abolish Cantonal Share on Stamp Duties	331	-5.85	0.00	
2002	Initiative «Protection of Mother and Baby»	488	5.79	0.60	
1995	Counterproposal to the Initiative «for an ecological and effective agriculture»	418	-5.73	0.54	AGRI LIB
2001	Federal Resolution promoting a Debt Break	480	-5.71	0.51	LESS DEBT
1981	For Protecting Consumers' Rights	307	5.66	0.00	
1985	Regulating Contributions for Education	328	-5.63	0.01	
1995	Initiative for better Age Insurance	423	5.60	0.85	CONTRA RET
2001	Federal Resolution on Abolishing Permissions to build Dioceses	479	-5.54	0.00	
2003	Federal Law on the Military	495	-5.44	0.02	LESS MILITARY
1996	Counterproposal to the Initiative «for a natural agriculture»	430	5.38	0.82	
1998	Initiative «for cheap aliments and ecological agriculture»	443	5.24	0.20	
2003	Initiative «Against Nuclear Power Plants»	501	5.16	0.17	CONTRA NUC
1987	Train 2000	348	5.13	0.00	
1985	For Longer Paid Vacations	329	5.10	0.08	MORE LEIS
1996	Federal Resolution on the Cantonal Authority on Personal Military Equipment	427	5.05	0.00	
2003	Federal Law on Civil Protection	496	-4.89	0.92	
1990	For Free Aare-Region	362	4.83	0.32	LESS ROAD
1999	Law on the Insurance of Disabled	457	-4.77	0.00	
1987	Asylum Law	344	-4.76	0.27	
2003	Federal Law on Cantonal Contributions to Treatments in Hospitals	494	4.75	0.09	
1992	Federal Resolution for a Civilian Service for Military Deniers	379	4.73	0.00	
1984	Against the Abuse of the Banking Secrecy	319	4.69	0.80	
2000	For a Pigouvian Tax on Energy	466	4.67	0.00	ENV
1994	Federal Resolution on Charges on National Streets	405	4.64	0.00	
1999	Asylum Law	454	-4.64	0.83	
1992	Swiss Military Code	380	4.63	0.00	
1997	Initiative "Youth Without Drugs"	438	-4.57	0.48	
1981	For improving the Federal Finances	308	-4.56	0.00	LESS DEBT
1999	Federal Resolution on Medical Prescription for Heroine	456	-4.54	0.41	DRUG
1991	For Reducing the Voting Age from 21 to 18	369	4.45	0.00	DD
1983	Energy Article	313	-4.45	0.01	
1995	Law on Age Insurance	422	-4.35	0.99	PRO RET AGE
2002	Initiative for Lower Working Hours	486	-4.33	0.00	MORE LEIS
1994	Initiative for a healthy Health Insurance	416	4.28	0.02	SUB HEALTH-INS.
2000	Federal Law on the Employees of the Government	473	-4.23	0.02	
1993	Measures on Unemployment Insurance	398	4.15	0.00	UNEMPL
1988	Initiative against Speculation with Properties	353	4.15	0.64	
2002	Initiative against Misuse in Asylum Matters	491	-4.05	0.00	LESS FOR
1993	Federal Resolution on Gambling Houses	390	-3.99	0.34	
2001	Initiative «for a better security on the streets with speed limit 30»	476	3.99	0.39	SAFE STREET
1984	Taxation of Heavy Traffic	316	-3.89	0.54	
1990	Initiative against Freeway between Murten and Yverdon	360	3.71	0.09	LESS ROAD
1988	For Restricting Immigration	355	-3.70	0.00	LESS FOR
1986	Culture Initiative	339	3.67	0.66	MORE CULT
2003	Initiative for sufficient Occupational Training	503	3.64	0.00	
2001	Initiative «For a voluntary civil service»	483	3.63	0.13	
1996	Law on the Organization of the Executive and Administration	431	-3.47	0.41	
1994	Federal Resolution on Traffic Road Charges	406	3.41	0.98	
1994	Federal Resolution on usage-dependent Traffic Road Charges	407	3.40	0.22	
1992	Against Misuse in Gene-Technology	378	-3.35	0.57	CONTRA GEN
1994	Law on Military forces with Peaceful Missions	412	3.34	0.01	
2001	Initiative «for Taxation of Capital Gains»	484	3.28	0.90	
1990	Initiative against Freeway in the Knonauer Amt	361	3.27	0.24	LESS ROAD
2001	Federal Law on the Army	477	-3.25	0.05	
1993	Federal Resolution on Federal Finances	399	-3.16	0.40	
1987	Law on Procedures on Initiatives with Alternative Drafts	347	3.08	0.00	
1999	Law on the Insurance of Mothers	458	3.07	0.08	PRO MOTHER
1989	Initiative for a Switzerland without Army	357	3.07	0.41	LESS MILITARY
1985	New Distribution Revenues Alcohol	332	-3.05	0.02	
2002	Federal Law on the Unemployment Insurance	492	2.94	0.29	
1995	Law on Reducing Federal Expenses	421	-2.68	0.74	LESS DEBT
1982	Against abusive Prices	311	2.65	1.00	
2001	Initiative «for a secure Age Insurance»	481	2.62	0.18	ENV
1998	Federal Resolution on a new Corn Article	446	-2.55	0.11	AGRI LIB
1984	Against the Sale of Homeland	320	2.48	0.83	
1992	Federal Resolution on the European Economic Area	388	-2.40	0.34	INT
1984	Radio and TV-Article	324	2.31	0.00	
2003	Initiative «For reasonable Health Costs»	499	2.21	0.80	
1993	Measures for Protecting the Social Insurances	401	2.21	0.08	
2000	Federal Resolution on Bilateral Agreements between Switzerland and the EU	464	-2.15	0.00	INT

1990	Law on the organization of the federal judicature	364	-2.15	0.00	
1999	Federal Resolution on a new Federal Constitution	453	2.15	0.00	
1999	Federal Resolution on Regulating Transplantation Medicine	450	2.13	0.11	
2000	Solar Initiative	465	2.09	0.17	ENV
1985	Abolishing Contributions for Corn with the Purpose of Self-Sufficiency	333	-2.07	0.08	AGRI SUB
1985	Abolish Federal Duty to Pay for Health	327	-2.07	0.63	
1999	Federal Resolution on the Eligibility in the Federal Council	449	2.04	0.08	
1995	Resolution on Dairy Farming	419	-1.95	0.74	AGRI LIB
1990	Federal Resolution on the Energy Article	367	1.94	0.72	
1999	Federal Resolution on Urgent Matters in the Area of Asylum	455	-1.88	0.86	
1996	Against the Federal Duty to buy Spirits	428	1.75	0.95	
1997	Against Federal Regulations on Gun Powder	436	-1.70	0.11	
1993	Federal Resolution against further Increases in Health Insurance Premias	397	-1.59	0.00	
2001	Initiative «for a Switzerland without Army»	482	1.49	0.14	LESS MILITARY
1993	Law on Customs on Fuel	389	1.46	0.02	
1986	Federal Solution on Domestic Sugar Industry	341	1.43	0.53	
1992	Law on Paysants' Land Rights	385	1.40	0.00	
1999	Federal Law on City and Regional Planning	452	1.25	0.01	
1998	Federal Resolution on Funds for the Infrastructure on Public Traffic	445	1.22	0.00	PUB TRANS
1993	Federal Resolution for Healthy Federal Finances	400	-1.14	0.02	LESS DEBT
1994	Law on Aviation	409	1.05	0.00	
2002	Initiative "Excessive Gold Reserves for the Age Insurance"	489	1.00	0.01	
1997	Initiative «Direct Democracy for Negotiations with the EU»	434	0.83	0.10	
1998	Federal Resolution on Measures for Budget Balancing	439	0.82	0.01	LESS DEBT
1996	Federal Resolution on the union of the community Vellerat with the Canton JU	426	0.80	0.70	
1984	Charges for the Use of National Roads	317	-0.76	0.91	
2001	Initiative «Yes to Europe!»	474	-0.71	0.44	INT
2002	Initiative for joining the United Nations	485	-0.68	0.00	INT
2000	Initiative for faster Direct Democracy	460	0.66	0.00	DD
1984	On the Compensation of Criminal Victims	325	0.61	0.00	
1988	Initiative for Shorter Working Hours	354	-0.56	0.08	MORE LEIS
1984	Protection of Motherhood	323	-0.39	0.00	PRO MOTHER
2003	Initiative «Yes to Fair Rental Prices»	497	0.39	0.19	CHEAP RENT
2001	Federal Law on the Army (Cooperation in Education)	478	-0.37	0.06	
1996	Federal Law regulating working conditions	433	-0.30	0.31	
2000	Federal Resolution on the Reform of the Judiciary	459	-0.29	0.43	
1991	Initiative for Decreasing the Retirement Age	372	-0.26	0.06	
1998	Initiative «for a reasonable drug policy»	447	0.12	0.88	DRUG
2000	For lower Costs of Hospitals	472	-0.05	0.00	CHEAP HOSP.
1993	Federal Resolution on Consumption Taxes	402	0.05	0.15	
1995	Law on Farming	420	0.00	0.50	AGRI LIB

Notes: The table reports for all the votes held between 1981 and 2003: The year of the vote, the title of the vote, the vote-number, the Gender-Gap, the P-Value of a hypothesis test "Approval Survey= Approval Ballot-Box" and the Policy Area (if classified). Grey votes have been assigned to one of the 30 policy areas studied. ENV: Environmental Protection; EQUAL: Equal Rights for Women and Men; INT: joining International Organizations; DD: more Direct Democracy; AGRI LIB: Liberalizing Agriculture; AGRI SUB: Against subsidies in the Agricultural Sector; DRUG: Pro Liberalizing Drugs; PUB TRANS: Pro Public Transport; SUB PARKING: Subsidies Parking Spaces; PRO HEALTH: Against Alcohol and Tobacco; LESS FOR: Pro Restricting Immigration; PRO FOR: For facilitating Integration of Foreigners; MORE CULT: For Promoting Culture; MORE LEIS: More Leisure; ABORTION: Pro Legalize Abortion; CHEAP HOSP./PHARMA: Subsidize in the Health Sector; PRO RET AGE: Pro Increasing the Retirement Age; SAFE STREET: Pro Speed Limits; CHEAP RENT: Pro Cheaper Rental Prices; PRO SPEED: Relax Speed Limits; CONTRA NUC: Against Nuclear Energy; LESS MILITARY: Against the Army; LESS ROAD: Against further Road Construction; UNEMPL: Reduce Unemployment Benefits; PRO DISABLED: Support the Disabled; EDU: Pro Free Education; SUB HEALTH-INS.: Subsidies Premia for Health Insurance; CONTRA RET: Against Increase Retirement Age; PRO MOTHER: Protection Motherhood.

Appendix Table 2: Votes with and without Survey Bias

	<i>International Affairs</i>			<i>Military</i>	<i>Environment</i>			<i>Transport</i>			<i>Agriculture</i>			<i>Legal</i>		<i>Less Debt</i>
	Pro Joining International Organizations	Against Foreign Immigration	Pro Foreign Immigration	Less Military	Protection of the Environment	Against Nuclear Energy	Against further Road Construction	Pro Speed Limits	Against Speed Limits	Against Subsidies Parking	Pro Public Transport	Against Subsidies Agriculture	Pro Liberalizing Agriculture	Equal Rights Women and Men	More Direct Democracy	
Female Dummy	0.0120 (0.0211)	-0.0905*** (0.0309)	0.0875** (0.0420)	0.0494** (0.0248)	0.0769*** (0.0158)	0.107*** (0.0219)	0.0294 (0.0240)	0.0550* (0.0325)	-0.0670 (0.0495)	0.0863 (0.0804)	0.00169 (0.0276)	0.114*** (0.0378)	-0.0112 (0.0274)	0.220*** (0.0385)	0.0337 (0.0295)	-0.0313 (0.0194)
Number of Ballots Observations	5 2,833	3 1,038	1 569	5 2,089	9 4,838	5 2,377	4 1,969	1 670	1 505	1 204	3 1,472	2 688	4 1,770	3 941	4 1,548	5 2,150
Female Dummy	0.00343 (0.0281)			0.0547* (0.0327)	0.0686*** (0.0179)	0.0999*** (0.0288)	0.0294 (0.0240)	0.0550* (0.0325)			-0.0237 (0.0356)	0.114*** (0.0378)	-0.0112 (0.0274)	0.206*** (0.0392)	0.0355 (0.0428)	-0.0526** (0.0259)
Number of Ballots Observations	3 1,517			3 916	6 3,344	3 1,342	4 1,969	1 670			2 962	2 688	4 1,770	1 450	2 682	2 881
	<i>Health</i>				<i>Education</i>			<i>Welfare</i>			<i>Culture and Leisure</i>		<i>Living</i>			
	Subsidies Health Insurance	Pro Liberalizing Drugs	Against Tobacco/Alcohol	Against Gen-Tech/Animal Test.	Pro Legalize Abortion	Cheaper Hospitals/Pharma-Prod.	Subsidies Health Insurance	Free Education	Reduce Unempl. Benefits	Decrease Retirement Age	Increase Retirement Age	Support for the Disabled	Longer Maternity Leave	More Culture	More Leisure	Pro Cheap Housing
Female Dummy	0.038 (0.032)	-0.0164 (0.0323)	0.163*** (0.0263)	0.0825*** (0.0236)	-0.0299 (0.0409)	-0.0388* (0.0226)	0.038 (0.032)	0.002 (0.068)	-0.0488 (0.0350)	0.0621*** (0.0237)	-0.0431 (0.0482)	0.137*** (0.0474)	0.0513* (0.0283)	0.0868* (0.0445)	0.0102 (0.0332)	0.0109 (0.0458)
Number of Ballots Observations	3 949	2 1,127	2 1,112	4 2,144	1 517	2 1,107	3 949	1 252	2 952	4 1,995	1 491	1 508	2 1,450	2 556	4 1,334	1 522
Female Dummy	0.0744 (0.0517)	-0.0164 (0.0323)	0.163*** (0.0263)	0.0657** (0.0268)	-0.0299 (0.0409)				-0.121** (0.0497)	0.0692** (0.0269)	-0.0431 (0.0482)				-0.0145 (0.0828)	0.0109 (0.0458)
Number of Ballots Observations	1 444	2 1,127	2 1,112	3 1,685	1 517				1 515	3 1,509	1 491				2 209	1 522

Notes: The table reports marginal effects from a probit model. The dependent variable is the voting decision, which is equal to one if the respondent supported the proposition and zero otherwise for the respective propositions shown in the column header. The table reports the coefficient on the female dummy. All specifications include canton and ballot fixed effects and controls as in Table 3. The first row repeats the baseline for the full sample of votes and the second row shows results for the restricted sample of votes with no survey bias. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficients with \*\*\* are significant at the 1 percent level, while those with \*\* (\*) are significant at the 5 (10) percent level.

Source: Authors' calculations.

**Appendix Table 3: Voting Behavior, Voters versus Non-Voters**

	<i>International Affairs</i>		<i>Military</i>	<i>Environment</i>		<i>Transport</i>			<i>Agriculture</i>		<i>Legal (1)</i>	
	Pro Joining International Organizations	Pro Foreign Immigration	Less Military	Protection of the Environment	Against Nuclear Energy	Against further Road Construction	Against Speed Limits	Against Subsidies Parking	Pro Public Transport	Against Subsidies Agriculture	Pro Liberalizing Agriculture	Equal Rights Women and Men
<b><i>Sample of Non-Voters</i></b>												
Female Dummy	0.103 (0.0811)	0.00601 (0.0673)	0.0794 (0.0804)	0.0611** (0.0310)	0.144*** (0.0386)	0.109*** (0.0287)	-0.231*** (0.0717)	0.158 (0.156)	0.0517 (0.0378)	-0.107 (0.0705)	0.0973** (0.0436)	-0.0120 (0.0475)
Observations	58	238	204	1,049	761	1,145	253	60	826	233	588	389
<b><i>Sample of Voters</i></b>												
Female Dummy	-0.0132 (0.0391)	0.0875** (0.0420)	0.0835* (0.0427)	0.0907*** (0.0242)	0.122*** (0.0297)	0.0294 (0.0240)	-0.0670 (0.0495)	0.0863 (0.0804)	0.00169 (0.0276)	0.114*** (0.0378)	-0.0112 (0.0274)	0.136*** (0.0430)
Observations	829	569	659	2,032	1,311	1,969	505	204	1,472	688	1,770	491
	<i>Legal (2)</i>		<i>Health</i>			<i>Welfare</i>			<i>Culture and Leisure</i>			
	More Direct Democracy	Subsidies Health Insurance	Pro Liberalizing Drugs	Against Tobacco/ Alcohol	Against Gen-Tech/ Animal Test.	Reduce Unempl. Benefits	Decrease Retirement Age	Increase Retirement Age	Longer Maternity Leave	More Culture	More Leisure	
<b><i>Sample of Non-Voters</i></b>												
Female Dummy	-0.0236 (0.0382)	0.0625 (0.0507)	-0.00562 (0.0511)	0.0701* (0.0382)	0.0809** (0.0348)	0.0161 (0.0530)	0.0247 (0.0518)	-0.134* (0.0750)	0.0518 (0.0429)	-0.0586 (0.0807)	0.0700* (0.0386)	
Observations	479	404	514	568	990	482	461	248	678	194	482	
<b><i>Sample of Voters</i></b>												
Female Dummy	0.0281 (0.0371)	0.0378 (0.0318)	-0.0164 (0.0323)	0.163*** (0.0263)	0.0825*** (0.0236)	-0.0488 (0.0350)	0.0580** (0.0247)	-0.0431 (0.0482)	0.0513* (0.0283)	0.0868* (0.0445)	0.0284 (0.0369)	
Observations	384	949	1,127	1,112	2,144	952	1,521	491	1,450	556	643	

*Notes:* The table reports marginal effects from a probit model. The dependent variable is the voting decision, which is equal to one if the respondent supported the proposition and zero otherwise for the respective propositions shown in the column header. The table reports the coefficient on the female dummy. All specifications include canton and ballot fixed effects and controls as in Table 3. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficients with \*\*\* are significant at the 1 percent level, while those with \*\* (\*) are significant at the 5 (10) percent level.

*Source:* Authors' calculations.

**Appendix Table 4: List of Propositions with Predictable Financial Consequences**

<i>More Expenditures, Subsidies or Taxes</i>			<i>Less Expenditures, Subsidies, Taxes or Debt</i>					
No.	<i>Increase Expenditures</i>	Result	No.	<i>Increase Subsidies</i>	Result	No.	<i>Decrease Federal Debt</i>	Result
313	Energy Article	No	333	Self-Supply with Corn (A)	Yes	400	For sound Federal Finances	Yes
323	Protection Motherhood (W)	No	335	Risk Guarantee for Small/Medium Enterprises	No	421	For Expenditures Controls	Yes
339	Culture Initiative	No	341	For Domestic Sugar Production (A)	No	439	For Balanced Budget	Yes
340	Guarantee Vocational Retraining (Edu)	No	425	Revision Language Article	Yes	480	For Debt Control	Yes
348	Railway 2000 (T)	Yes						
349	Protection Moor (Env)	Yes		<b><i>Increase Taxes</i></b>			<b><i>Decrease Subsidies</i></b>	
350	Change Health Insurance (H)	No	308	Improving Federal Budget	Yes	326	Against Fees for Primary School (Edu)	Yes
363	Vine Cultivation (A)	No	312	New Regulation Fuel Taxes	Yes	327	Against Federal Contributions for Health (H)	Yes
367	Energy Article	Yes	316	For Taxing Heavy Traffic	Yes	328	Resolutions on Contributions on Education (Edu)	No
370	Promoting Public Transport (T)	No	317	Fees for Road Use	Yes	413	Against Corn Subsidies (A)	Yes
373	For sound Finances of Health Insurance (H)	No	324	Law on Radio and TV	Yes	428	Against Duty on Liquor Purchases	Yes
377	Protection of Rivers and Lages (Env)	Yes	331	Against Canton Share in Federal Stamp Duty	Yes	429	Against Federal Contributions for Parking Space	Yes
381	Saving the Rivers and Lakes (Env)	No	332	Distribution of Revenues from Alcohol	Yes	436	Against "Pulverregal"	Yes
382	Construction of Railway through the Alps (T)	Yes	371	For Reorganizing Federal Finances	No	437	Financing Unemployment Insurance (W)	No
386	Salary Parliamentary Members	No	389	For Increasing Fuel Charges	Yes	446	New Corn Article (A)	Yes
387	Improve Infrastructure for Parliament	No	399	Resolution on Federal Finances	Yes			
410	Promoting Cultural Activities	No	400	For sound Federal Finances	Yes		<b><i>Decrease Taxes</i></b>	
416	For a new Health Insurance (H)	No	401	For sound Social Insurance	Yes	384	Change Law on Stamp Duty	Yes
423	Securing Invalidity/Age Insurance (W)	No	405	For Fee on Road Use	Yes			
430	Counter-Initiative: For Ecological Agriculture	Yes	406	For Fees on Heavy Traffic	Yes		<b><i>Decrease Expenditures</i></b>	
431	Re-Organisation Administration	No	407	Introduction of Fees for Heavy Traffic	Yes	346	Vote on Military Expenditures (Def)	No
444	Revision Age Insurance (W)	No	442	Law on Fees for Heavy Traffic	Yes	393	Against Fighter Planes (Def)	No
445	Infrastructure for Public Transportation (T)	Yes	465	For a Solar Energy Tax	No	421	Reduce Growth of Expenditures	Yes
458	Law on Motherhood Insurance (W)	No	484	For a Capital Gains Tax	No	422	Change Pension and Disability Laws (W)	Yes
469	For a flexible Age Insurance (W)	No				427	Canton Responsibility for Military Equipment (Def)	No
470	For flexible Retirement Age (W)	No				357	For Switzerland without Army (Def)	No
500	Equal Rights for the Disabled (W)	No				471	Reduction of Military Expenditures (Def)	No
						482	For Switzerland without Army (Def)	No

*Notes:* The table lists all federal propositions between 1981 and 2003, which either led to an increase in federal expenditures, taxes, subsidies, or a decrease in expenditures, taxes, subsidies or public debt. The information is taken from publications of the federal government, which publishes the fiscal consequences for each new law and executive order. Expenditures in individual policy areas are constructed from the respective votes. These are marked after the title using the following abbreviations: (A) for agriculture, (T) for public transport, (Env) for environment, (Def) for Defense, (W) for welfare, (H) for health and (Edu) for education.

*Source:* Federal Archives of Switzerland; available online at <http://www.ads.bar.admin.ch/ADS>.