Trade Liberalization, Economic Activity, and Political Violence in the Global South: Evidence from PTAs

by Francesco Amodio, Leonardo Baccini Giorgio Chiovelli and Michele Di Maio

Discussion Thiemo Fetzer (@fetzert) April 20, 2023

- Growing empirical literature documenting the diverse effects of growing trade integration
- Globalization creates "winners and losers"
- Paper documents this in the case of preferential trade agreements (PTAs)
- Political instability and violence as extreme form of "cost" of trade integration
- this paper looks at localized effects

 \rightarrow support in favor of welfare-increasing trade integration and specialisation is endogenous to the lived experience and narratives that arise

- Paper motivated by work on trade-induced political shocks
- Find this problematic as work by Autor et al and Colatone et al stories are basically silent of timing
- Existing literature has primarily focused on documenting associations
- Grievances versus timing versus (political) technology shock (social media,...)
- Most papers go from grievance to political fallout without understanding what comes in between

- Distinguishing of labor intensity of crops
- Political Violence increases in counties that produce crops that are produced but also consumed locally while it decreases in counties producing crops that are consumed elsewhere
- interpret this evidence as showing that asymmetry in the gains from trade between workers vs land and capital owners is a key mechanism through which export exposure increases political violence

On mechanisms discussion: heterogenous effects


	Political Violence					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	
Export Exposure	0.260*	0.119	0.143	0.134	0.114	
	(0.146)	(0.089)	(0.097)	(0.093)	(0.086)	
\times Urban	0.172***	0.110***	0.119***	0.110***	0.106***	
	(0.056)	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.034)	
\times Far from Border	0.017	0.014	0.020	0.013	0.012	
	(0.042)	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.026)	
× Far from Coast	-0.201*	-0.135**	-0.139*	-0.141**	-0.130*	
	(0.110)	(0.068)	(0.074)	(0.071)	(0.066)	
× Rugged	0.062 (0.111)	-0.036 (0.062)	-0.018 (0.069)	-0.023 (0.067)	-0.035 (0.061)	
× High in Diamonds	0.129	-0.075	-0.077	-0.032	-0.082	
	(0.105)	(0.064)	(0.068)	(0.071)	(0.064)	
\times High in Petrol	-0.177***	-0.031	-0.058	-0.047	-0.033	
	(0.053)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.036)	
\times Ethnically Diverse	0.086 (0.058)	0.046 (0.032)	0.047 (0.035)	0.048 (0.034)	0.045 (0.032)	
County FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Country-Year FE	No	Yes	No	No	No	
Country-specific trends	No	No	Yes	No	No	
Country-specific flex. trends	No	No	No	Yes	No	
Country-spec. trends (tr/non-tr)	No	No	No	No	Yes	
Observations	197,676	197,676	197,676	197,676	197,676	
R-squared	0.665	0.716		0.703	0.705	


Table 4: Export Exposure and Political Violence - Heterogeneity

 \rightarrow violence effects are concentrated in areas that are urbanized and close to sea (points of exports)

What is missing: more nuanced welfare analysis

Paper is silent on the evaluation of persistent versus temporary effects





 \rightarrow economic upside effects seem to persist

What is missing: more nuanced welfare analysis

Paper is silent on the evaluation of persistent versus temporary effects




Figure 1L: Export Exposure and Political Violence: Event Study

 \rightarrow political violence effects seem temporary

- Which PTAs or which countries drive the results?
- Does it matter who you have a PTA with?
- Urban and/or near coast suggest that political control of export paths seems most salient
- Economic rents from trade liberalization are contested where they are easily contestable
- Dropping each country in turn ; dropping all PTAs from each continent in turn and re-estimate full effect concern that effects are driven by Egypt
- Does market size with whom you have a PTA may matter?

What is missing: role of institutions (mechanisms?)

- Interpret this as shock to distribution of economic power in a country operating mostly via land ownership
- "Political violence" can be interpreted as data representing this "struggle" to rebalance power in a country
- (Temporary?) nature of impact of PTA signature on violence shocks is transitory
- Institutions and state capacity matter and I am surprised this is not discussed at all
- Missing heterogeneity:
 - quality of institutions (elections/democracy/contestability of rents Fetzer and Marden, 2017)
 - degree of (fiscal) centralisation (revenue sharing: Fetzer and Kyburz, 2022)
 - existence and extent of taxation system (Besley and Persson, 2009)
 - existence and extent of welfare system (Fetzer, 2019, 2020)

Who is the PTA with?

Table A.1: List of Countries and PTAs

D	Country	Preferential Trade Agreement
	Algeria	Algeria-EU (2002)
	Cambodia	ASEAN Japan (2008)
		ASEAN Australia New Zealand (2009)
3	Colombia	Colombia USA (2006)
		Colombia Canada (2008)
5	Costa Rica	Costa Rica Canada (2001)
		CAPTA DR USA (2004)
5	Dominican Republic	CAFTA DR USA (2004)
6	Egypt	Egypt-EU (2001)
7	El Salvador	CAFTA DR USA (2004)
	Gasternals	CAPTA DR USA (2004)
9	Honduras	CAPTA DR USA (2004)
		Honduras Canada (2013)
10	Nicoragua	CAFTA DR USA (2004)
	India	India Japan (2011)
2	Indonesia	Indenesia Japan (2007)
		ASEAN Japan (2008)
	keelen (ASEAN Australia New Zealand (2009)
3	lordan	Jordan US (2000) Jordan EU (1997)
4	Laos	Jordan Canada (2009) ASEAN Japan (2008)
۰.	Laos	ASEAN Japan (2008) ASEAN Australia New Zealand (2009)
5	Lebanen	Lebanes EU (2002)
6	Malaysia	Makovia Japan (2005)
	Notatyson	ASEAN Janin (2008)
		ASEAN Aptrilia New Zealand (2009)
		Malaysia Australia (2012)
7	Mexico	Mexico FU (2000)
	NEXKO	Mexico Japan (2004)
	Morocco	Morocco EU (1996)
	MARCED	Morocco US (2001)
4	Myennar	ASEAN Japan (2008)
	Nyama	ASEAN Australia New Zealand (2009)
	Panama	Panarra US (2007)
~	Farmer	Panaria Canada (2000)
1	Pro	Pers US (2006)
		Peru Canada (2008)
		Peru Janan (2011)
2	Philippines	Philippines Japan (2006)
	routhnes	ASEAN Japan (2008)
		ASEAN Australia New Zealand (2009)
	South Africa	South Africa EU (1999)
ы. М	Thailand	Thailand Australia (2004)
	1545400	Thailand Japan (2007)
		ASEAN Jana (2008)
		ASEAN Japan (2008) ASEAN Austrilia New Zealand (2009)
15	Vietnam	Vietnam US (2000)
	VICUARD	Victam Japan (2008)
		ASEAN Japan (2008)
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		Columbia Canada (2008)
4	Casta Rica	Costa Rica Canada (2001)
		CAPEA DR USA (2004)
5	Dominican Republic	CAFEA DR USA (2004)
5	Egypt Fil Salvalor	Egyp-EU (2001)
2	El Salvador Genterada	CAFEA DR USA (2004) CAFEA DR USA (2004)
÷.	Bookers	CAPTA DR USA (2000)
1	CO. NO. OF ALL AD	Handoras Canada (2013)
10	Neatheran	CAFTA DR USA (2004)
	India	India Japan (2011)
12	Indenesia	Indonesia Japan (2007)
	and and a second	ASEAN Japan (2006)
		ASEAN Australia New Zealand (2009)
13	Ardan (C)	Jondan US (2000)
		Jordan EU (1997)
		Jordan Canada (2005)
14	Lass	ASEAN Japan (2006)
		ASEAN Australia New Zealand (2009)
15	Lebanon	Lehanan EU (2002)
6	Malaysia	Malaysia Japan (2005)
		ASEAN Japan (2008)
		ASEAN Australia New Zealand (2009)
		Malaysia Acarralia (2012)
17	Mexico	Mexico EU (2000)
		Mexico Japan (2004)
18	Meraceo	Manucco IIU (1996)
		Maroeco US (2004)
19	Myanmar	ASEAN Japan (2008)
		ASEAN Aurralia New Zealand (2009)
20	Panama	Panama US (2007)
21	Perm	Panama Canada (2008) Peru US (2008)
24	Peru	
		Peru Canada (2008) Peru Japan (2011)
22	Philippings	Philippines Japan (2006)
44	Prangpanes	ASEAN Japan (2008)
		ASEAN Australia New Zealand (2009)
23	South Advice	South Africa BU (1997)
24	Theland	Thailand Australia (2004)
e .	LINELIKO	Thailand Japan (2007)
		ASEAN Japan (2008)
		ASEAN Australia New Zealand (2009)
25	Vietnam	Vietnam US (2000)
		Victors Jana (2008)
		ASEAN Japan (2008)
		ASEAN Australia New Zealand (2009)

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		CAFTA DR USA (2004)
5	Dominican Republic	CAPTA DR USA (2004)
6	Eavet	Eavet-EU (2001)
7	El Salvador	CAPTA DR USA (2004)
8	Gustemila	CAFTA DR USA (2004)
ō.	Honduras	CAPTA DR USA (2004)
		Honduras Canada (2013)
10	Nicatanua	CAPTA DR USA (2004)
ii -	India	India Japan (2011)
12	Indonesia	Indonesia Japan (2007)
		ASEAN Japan (2008)
		ASEAN Australia New Zealand (2009)
13	Inter	Jordan US (2000)
	Access 1	Jordan EU (1997)
		Jordan Canada (2009)
14	Lass	ASEAN Juran (2008)
	Later	ASEAN Australia New Zealand (2009)
15	Lehonon	Lebaron EU (2002)
15	Malaysia	Malaysia Japan (2005)
10	Romayona	ASEAN Juran (2008)
		ASEAN Australia New Zealand (2009)
		ASEAN Australia New Zealand (2009) Malaysia Australia (2012)
17	Mexico	Manyon Addinina (2012) Mexico EU (2000)
17	Mesico	
		Mexico Japan (2004)
18	Morocco	Morocco EU (1996)
		Morocco US (2004)
19	Myanmar	ASEAN Jupan (2008)
		ASEAN Australia New Zealand (2009)
20	Panama	Panama US (2007)
		Panama Canada (2010)
21	Peru	Peru US (2006)
		Peru Canada (2008)
		Peru Japan (2011)
22	Philippines	Philippines Japan (2006)
		ASEAN Jupan (2008)
		ASEAN Australia New Zealand (2009)
23	South Africa	South Africa EU (1999)
24	Thailand	Thailand Australia (2004)
		Thailand Japan (2007)
		ASEAN Japan (2008)
		ASEAN Australia New Zealand (2009)
25	Vietnam	Victram US (2000)
		Vietnam Japan (2008)
		ASEAN Jupan (2008)
		ASEAN Australia New Zealand (2009)

 Rather than showing country-by-country exercise (Table A6) re-estimate dropping each country in term to document what happens to the ATE looks like

Which countries drive the result?

			Economic Activ	ity	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Algeria	Cambodia	Colombia	Costa Rica	Dominican R
Export Exposure	0.111***	0.006	0.003***	0.014	0.003
	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.001)	(0.009)	(0.010)
	Egypt	El Salvador	Guatemala	Honduras	India
Export Exposure	2.091***	0.002	-0.012*	0.036***	0.090***
	(0.156)	(0.014)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.004)
	Indonesia	Jordan	Laos	Lebanon	Malaysia
Export Exposure	0.019***	0.329***	0.061***	-0.015	0.107***
	(0.001)	(0.030)	(0.008)	(0.027)	(0.007)
	Mexico	Morocco	Myanmar	Nicaragua	Panama
Export Exposure	0.019***	0.103***	0.027***	0.019***	0.036***
	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.006)
	Peru	Philippines	South Africa	Thailand	Vietnam
Export Exposure	-0.010***	0.017***	0.040***	0.104***	0.161***
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.009)
Cell FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table A.6: Export Exposure and Economic Activity by Country

 Rather than showing country-by-country exercise (Table A6) re-estimate dropping each country in term to document what happens to the ATE looks like

Which countries drive the result?

			Political Violen	ce	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Algeria	Cambodia	Colombia	Costa Rica	Dominican R
Export Exposure	-0.003***	-0.000	0.001**	0.008**	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.000)	(0.003)	(0.002)
	Egypt	El Salvador	Guatemala	Honduras	India
Export Exposure	0.178**	0.010*	0.000	0.000	0.027***
	(0.073)	(0.006)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
	Indonesia	Jordan	Laos	Lebanon	Malaysia
Export Exposure	0.001***	0.035***	0.000	0.070	0.007***
	(0.000)	(0.013)	(0.000)	(0.057)	(0.002)
	Mexico	Morocco	Myanmar	Nicaragua	Panama
Export Exposure	0.002***	0.001*	0.001	-0.000	0.002**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
	Peru	Philippines	South Africa	Thailand	Vietnam
Export Exposure	-0.000*	0.016***	0.011***	-0.001	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Cell FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table A.8: Export Exposure and Political Violence by Country

Notes, (*) p-values < 0.1; ** p-values < 0.05; *** p-values < 0.01) The unit of observation is the FAO-GAEZ cell. Standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the same level. Export Exposures is the FTA-drivene export exposure of partial unit (i) nyar t that we obtain combining time variation in traffity with cross-sectional variation in crops suitability, as described in equation 1. The dependent variable is the log of political volorence (i.e., the number of hostile and violent events in IECMS). The coefficient is

 Rather than showing country-by-country exercise (Table A6) re-estimate dropping each country in term to document what happens to the ATE looks like

Sidestepping: arbitrariness of space – SUTVA violation

- Much of the empirical literature in conflict is focused on aggregating conflict-event data to artificial spatial constructs
- What is the "optimal" level of spatial representation of a phenomena such as conflict is a question that depends on the data generating process
 - Accuracy of conflict event data geolocation imposes
 - Spatial resolution of satellite image product
- Ongoing work Barbosa, Fetzer & Souza on "Conflict in Space" tries to suggest an "optimal aggregation" this approach
- Administrative boundaries vs statistical boundaries vs artificial boundaries
- Understanding data generating processes is important from a statistical standpoint and an economic standpoint
- Data generating process can help identify "optimal spatial and temporal aggregation"

 \rightarrow in essence: risk of specification mining is much deeper: bias-variance trade off is guided by the way that data is cut in space and time.

- Endogeneity of the PTA design why some countries NOT enter PTAs when they could? Are political instability considerations a feature here?
- Temporary versus permanent evaluation is key
- Long time period under consideration technology is considered as static but we know shifts in labor versus capital intensity
- You are estimating a LATE
- Lack of a pure control

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